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THE MAN IN THE MIRROR
David A. Logan*
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION. By Richard A. Posner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. vi, 156. $18.95.
A book often tells you as much about its author as it does about its
subject. No better proof for this proposition can be found than Richard Posner's Cardozo: A Study in Reputation.
In the course of considering why Cardozo remains a giant of the
law more than three score years after his death, Posner offers some
useful insights into the nature of reputation, jurisprudence, and rhetoric. But far more interesting is the light that Cardozo sheds on Posner
himself. Now into his second decade on the federal bench, Posner has
changed from a dogmatic academic champion oflaw and economics to
a pragmatic judge, concerned with morals and rhetoric; in short, a
judge much like the revered Cardozo. That this change has occurred
is clear. Less certain are the reasons for it, but Posner's study of Cardozo's career provides important clues as to why he has embarked on
such a fascinating personal and professional odyssey. In the end, I am
convinced that Posner's evolution is genuine, if to a degree tactically
motivated. Ifhe is to be considered his generation's Cardozo, a slavish
adherence to law and economics just would not do, and a more flexible
jurisprudence and humane rhetoric had to be developed; exit Posner
the economist, enter Posner the pragmatist.

I. THE MIRROR
Benjamin Cardozo is famous. Richard Posner tells us why in Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, a work based on Posner's Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School. According to Posner,
Cardozo is the first "full-length critical (not biographical) judicial
study, employing tools of social science as well as oflegal doctrine" (p.
viii). It also is the first monograph-length study of an individual judge
that aspires to be "evaluative," "critical not pious," and "systematic,
nonpolitical, and nonpolemical" (p. viii). After briefly summarizing
Cardozo's life, 1 Posner turns to Cardozo's reputation, observing that
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. B.A. 1971, Bucknell University; M.A. 1972,
Wisconsin; J.D. 1977, University of Virginia. - Ed. Many thanks to Miles Foy, Mike Gerhardt,
Wayne Logan, John Noyes, Alan Palmiter, Charity Scott, Jeanne Wine, and Ron Wright for
their comments on an earlier draft and to Marion Benfield, Bill Kaplin, Joel Newman, and Wilson Parker for discussing Posner and Cardozo with me.
l. Pp. 1-6. Cardozo was born into and shaped by the values of a close-knit Sephardic Jewish
community in New York City. His father was a trial judge who resigned from the bench in
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while Cardozo generally is placed in the "highest rank" of American
judges, there is a written and oral tradition that dissents from this
view. 2 Jerome Frank was harshly critical of Cardozo's writing style,
describing it as having an "alien grace,"3 and Grant Gilmore criticized
both the style and substance of Cardozo's work. 4 Other critics point
out that Cardozo was able to decide a case in an innovative way and
yet make the outcome appear unexceptionable and, indeed, inevitable,
resulting in the lingering image of a "tricky guy." 5 Posner concludes
that these unflattering evaluations are inconsistent with his sense that
Cardozo has a generally sound reputation; "[t]here is a mystery here
which the subsequent chapters will try to unravel" (p. 19).
Posner first attempts to define what constitutes a good reputation.
He concludes that it is the "practical[] equivalent" of fame: to be
"widely regarded in a good light" (p. 58). But, as Posner recognizes,
good reputation may not always be the same as merit, and in any
event, the conclusion that someone has a good reputation must be
scrutinized in "the present age of relativism" (p. 58). Reputation is
"conferred by the people doing the reputing rather than produced by
the reputed one - and is conferred for their purposes, not his" (p. 59).
Posner further observes that posthumous reputation is facilitated by
response to allegations of impropriety arising out of his Tweed Ring connections. Cardozo never
married and remained closest to his (also unmarried) older sister, Nell. He was tutored at home
by the writer Horatio Alger and graduated from Columbia College at 19, having studied the
humanities with an emphasis on philosophy. Cardozo left Columbia Law School before taking
his degree, and entered the family's law firm, where over two decades he established an outstanding reputation as a litigator. He was elected to the state trial bench in 1913 and, after only a
month, was detailed to assist the Court of Appeals with its overburdened docket. He never
returned to the trial bench, being elected to his own term on the state's highest court in 1917.
Ten years later, he was elected Chief Judge. He served in that capacity until 1932 when President Hoover appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court. His years on the Court were neither
particularly happy nor healthy, and he died in 1938. Id.
2. Pp. 9-12. For example, Posner recounts that Warren Seavey used to admonish his torts
students to avoid using metaphors and aphorisms that pass for legal analysis. Building upon
Cardozo's famous "danger invites rescue" from Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437
(N.Y. 1921), Seavey would say "anyone who states on the exam 'danger invites rescue' invites an
F."
3. P. 10. Posner fails to mention some of the other highly unflattering descriptions in
Frank's anonymous piece, published several years after Cardozo's death: his opinions were "obscurely worded pronouncement[s]" which "ape[d] the English" and represented a "living museum of departed English usages." Anon Y. Mous, The Speech ofJudges: A Dissenting Opinion,
29 VA. L. REV. 62S, 639, 636 (1943).
4. P. 12. Gilmore wrote: "[his opinions were so] elliptical, convoluted, at times incomprehensible .•• that the less gifted lower court New York judges were frequently at a loss to understand what they were being told." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 7S (1977).
S. P. lS. G. Edward White is the most pointed example of this view, characterizing Cardozo
as a hyperambitious hypocrite. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRAD!•
TION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 2S4-60 (1988). White's allegations are based
upon a thin historical record. Compare White's conclusions to those found in Paul Bricker,
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Fresh Look at a Great Judge, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 23 n.112
(1984), and Ira H. Carmen, The President, Politics and the Power ofAppointment: Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, SS VA. L. REV. 616, 619-20 (1969).
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the generality, variety, and ambiguity of the reputee's work. 6 Luck
also plays a role - the knack for having one's vision meld with
worldly events. Posner argues that an "attractive persona" and longevity tend to promote posthumous reputation (p. 65). Finally, reputation, once established, tends to feed on itself.7
Having to his satisfaction defined, or at least described, reputation,
Posner determines that there must be some way to measure it. Posner
sets out to measure Cardozo's influence by counting citations. In
Chapter Five, Posner traces the names of selected scholars and judges
through law reviews. This data reveals that citation frequency is positively correlated with service on the U.S. Supreme Court, with recency, and with an atheoretical bent (pp. 74-80). It also shows that
while Cardozo is the most cited state court judge, he is not as frequently cited in law reviews as many more contemporary, but generally less well-regarded Supreme Court Justices (Burger, Blackmun)8 or
scholars, both practical {Tribe, Prosser) and theoretical (Dworkin,
Michelman). Yet, when Cardozo's vintage - as well as his relatively
brief tenure on the Supreme Court - is taken into account, Posner
concludes that these numbers support the view that Cardozo has a
good reputation.
Posner's count of how often Cardozo's judicial opinions are cited
in other judicial opinions is also revealing. Cardozo's New York
Court of Appeals opinions are cited by the courts of New York and
other jurisdictions far more frequently than those written by his colleagues (pp. 80-86). Similarly, Posner's analysis of Cardozo's Supreme
Court years shows that over time his opinions have come to be cited
more often than those of his respected colleagues, Louis Brandeis and
Harlan Stone (pp. 86-90).
Finally, Posner attempts to divine Cardozo's reputation among
casebook editors. He surveys casebooks in torts, contracts, and several other common law areas and concludes that Cardozo opinions
appear far more frequently than those of his state court colleagues (pp.
90-91). From all of this, Posner concludes that the empirical data
tends to "confirm the high repute in which, by casual impression, Cardozo is held" (p. 91 ).
Posner devotes the remainder of the book to exploring just why
Cardozo is held in such high regard. Of the qualities Posner offers up,
three stand out: Cardozo's antiformalist pragmatism, an attractive
6. Pp. 60-62. Posner notes that diversification improves reputation only after the reputee has
already established a baseline of good reputation; too much diffusion of point of view early in a
career makes it initially harder to achieve fame.
7. P. 68. This occurs in part because a reputer can effectively and efficiently bolster her
position by calling upon the name of the reputee in an effort to cast reflected glory upon her
position.
·
8. Because of the length of his tenure on the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo is generally thought of as a state court judge.
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persona (including a concern with morals), and, perhaps most significantly, rhetorical eloquence.
Cardozo's pragmatism was systematically articulated in The Nature of the Judicial Process. 9 Posner considers this to be the "classic,
full-blown exposition" of the "pragmatic" theory of adjudication (p.
21). Posner credits the book for being the seminal self-conscious portrait of the judge at work, written from "a distinctively or identifiably
judge's point of view" (p. 32). In its rejection of formalism - the
strict adherence to a settled set of abstract principles unrelated to actual human experience - the candor reflected in The Nature of the
Judicial Process led to the important and more radical critique of the
realists (p. 21 ).
Posner also surveys Cardozo's judicial opinions, with an eye toward whether Cardozo was able to carry out his pragmatic jurisprudential agenda on the bench. Often, Posner concludes, Cardozo could
not. Posner considers Hymes v. New York Central Railroad 10 to be a
paradigmatic Cardozo opinion, evidencing not only great judicial craft
(or, as Posner terms it, "rhetoric"), but also Cardozo's antiformalist
pragmatism. Cardozo refused to apply the strictures of the common
law rules involving trespassers to a claim brought by a "lad of sixteen"
who was injured by falling electrical wires while preparing to dive into
a public river from a plank protruding from a railroad's property.
Cardozo emphasized that "the rights of bathers do not depend upon
... nice distinctions [representative of] a jurisprudence of conceptions."11 Posner salutes Cardozo's effective personification of the
plaintiff and description of his denouement, as well as the skillful use
of geological and spatial metaphors - references to quicksand, planes,
concentric spheres, and the like - in an opinion that "sweeps to its
climax" (pp. 52, 55). Unfortunately, while embracing a realist's view
of the situation and calling up "considerations of analogy, of convenience, of policy, and of justice," 12 Cardozo never tells us exactly how
these ends are served by allowing the trespassing youth to recover.
Posner concludes, "[I]t is Cardozo the rhetorician, rather than Cardozo the pragmatic policy analyst ... whose hand is visible" (p. 53).
Throughout the book Posner extols the virtues of Cardozo's rhetorical style, emphasizing the careful word selection, distinctive sentence structure, and facility at reworking the arguments of others. 13
In particular, Posner commends Cardozo's ability to coin successful
9. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
10. 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).
11. 131 N.E. at 899-900.
12. 131 N.E. at 900.
13. Pp. x, 95, 98, 126-27. Cardozo's opinions reflect "a master's touch as unmistakably as
Shakespeare's paraphrases of Sir Thomas North's translations of Plutarch." P. 112. Posner describes Cardozo's ability to provide "value added" to the opinions of lower court judges and to
the briefs of counsel as turning "dross into gold." P. 111.
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epigrams. When Cardozo wrote "[t]he criminal is to go free because
the constable blundered," 14 Cardozo was able to "pack[] into a simple
sentence of eleven words the entire case against the exclusionary
rule." 15
Posner also identifies Cardozo's concern with morals, not only in
his opinions in equity (where such concerns are to be expected), but
also those in law, in which Cardozo endeavored to make the common
law more closely reflect the prevalent morality in the affected nonlegal
community. 16 However, Posner also details how Cardozo often failed
to follow through on his pragmatist manifesto, especially in the scope
of liability opinions, 17 that Posner says "do not hang together," "lack
thrust," and are "inconsisten[t]" (pp. 113, 107, 113). Yet Posner
views this inconsistency as ultimately contributing to Cardozo's reputation because it provides some grist for everybody's mill: these
opinions "demonstrate[ ] the importance of generality, of omnisignificance" (p. 113).
Chapter Seven is Posner's wrap-up of the question of Cardozo's
reputation. According to Posner, Cardozo's primary contribution was
"pedagogical" in that he made the law "clearer, more interesting,
more intelligible," and, at least modestly, more pragmatic (p. 126).
When he made an innovation, it occurred without calling attention to
that fact, a mark both of a reformer (but not a radical) and of a skilled
rhetorician (pp. 127-28). Posner lists the following additional factors
as contributing to Cardozo's "solidly professional reputation": appointment to the Supreme Court, the opportunity to serve on the most
influential state court of his time, the extrajudicial writings, his attractive personal qualities, and his close relationship with academics (pp.
128-32). But when all is said and done, it is with Cardozo's rhetorical
skills that Posner is most taken, and to which Posner primarily attributes Cardozo's reputation (p. 132-33).

II.

THE REFLECTIONS

The task Posner chose here was not a daunting one. Posner sets
14. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
15. Pp. 56. Elsewhere Posner reminds us of other Cardozo gems: "danger invites rescue,''
Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921); "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,'' Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931); "[t]he soundness ofa conclusion may not infrequently be tested by its
consequences," Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1931).
16. Posner cites Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (requirements contract has
implied term requiring "best efforts"), as a case in which Cardozo tried to make the law follow
the understanding of business people (pp. 92-97), and Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437
(N.Y. 1921) (railroad owes duty to person trying to rescue injured passenger), as an example of
Cardozo's effort to have the common law reflect the prevalent morality. Pp. 101-02.
17. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Glanzer v. Shephard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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out to prove that Benjamin Cardozo has a good reputation, surely as
uncontroversial an assertion as one can make these days. But the process of looking closely at Cardozo must have suggested to Posner parallels between his own career and that of his subject. In fact, many of
the aspects of Cardozo's life and work that Posner finds significant
serve to cast reflections of Posner the scholar, judge, and man.

A. Posner the Jurisprudent on Cardozo the Jurisprudent
Posner introduces the book by observing that "Cardozo was also a
distinguished contributor to jurisprudence - the philosophy of law advocating a form of legal pragmatism that resembles the pragmatism
advocated in my book on jurisprudence." 18 Cardozo's extrajudicial
writings are noteworthy because they represent "the first systematic
effort by a judge to explain how judges reason," written with an "articulate self-consciousness about the judicial function" (p. 32). Cardozo
acknowledged that judges must legislate because faithful consideration
of precedent, history, or custom does not always provide the answer to
difficult questions in individual cases. In such circumstances, Cardozo
would apply the "method of sociology." By this Cardozo meant that
he would attempt to identify and then implement the outcome that
best suited the general social welfare, in light of considerations of justice and the mores of the community. 19 While by no means clear
about exactly how to divine this information or how to weigh it, or
always successful in following through by applying it, 2 Cardozo's judicial philosophy was candid and reflective, and, perhaps most importantly, it rejected the rigid formalist notions of law that had continued
to influence, if not predominate, into the third decade of this century.
Perhaps because of the perceived press of time2 1 or an unwillingness to explore the profound implications of a system that gives judges
the power to decide what is in the social welfare, Posner's discussion
of Cardozo's jurisprudence is superficial. Cardozo tasked the judge
with determining what is "moral." The judge must identify and fol-

°

18. P. vii. Posner then cites not just his book The Problems ofJurisprudence (1990) [herein·
after POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE], but also his earlier Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Rela·
tion (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE], which is less obviously a work of
pragmatic jurisprudence.
19. See CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 66, 71-72, 106.
20. BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING (rev. ed.
1969); Ernest Nagel, Reflections on ''The Nature ofthe Judicial Process," 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 55
(1979); Edwin W. Patterson, Cardozo's PhilosophyofLaw(pts. 1&2),88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 156
(1939).
21. Posner averages a book and several articles a year while serving as a federal judge. This
must make it difficult for him to give full attention to the mundane aspects of organization and
editing. A number of his arguments in Cardozo are made in scatter-shot fashion. For example,
in the midst of discussing the possible theoretical justifications for Cardozo's opinion in Ul·
tramares, Posner digresses to point out how Cardozo's writing improves on the work of other
lawyers, before returning to the subject at hand. Pp. 111-12.
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low "the principle and practice of the men and women of the community whom the social mind would rank as intelligent and virtuous," 22
and this enterprise is most critical in times of rapid social change. 2 3
This analysis surely describes a process that is pregnant with political
ramifications. A judge is elected by the majority (or appointed by government officials elected by majorities). To ask that cases be decided
by reference to what is moral in light of the acquired wisdom of the
community is surely to risk replicating the power arrangements with
which the judge is familiar and comfortable (given the successful acquisition of high office).24 Other problems abound. Do these determinative values spring only from the majority of the community? Must
they reflect actual practices or merely aspirations?25 In hard cases,
how is the community consensus identified? Posner ignores these difficulties. Finally, the tension created by Cardozo's concern with utility
(or "social welfare") on the one hand and notions of moral duty on the
other is also glossed over. 26 Posner is content to characterize Cardozo
as a pragmatist and antiformalist, as if flexibility and relative candor
are satisfactory descriptions of, let alone standards for, the exercise of
judicial power. 27
Posner's admiration for Cardozo's pragmatism might at first blush
seem puzzling to a reader only casually familiar with the Posner canon. For more than a decade, roughly 1972 to 1987,28 Richard Posner
22. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1928).
23. CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 136-38.
24. See Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486 (1982)
("Although evidently struck by the power common-law judges exercise in [difficult cases], Cardozo was not moved to question the legitimacy of that power."); see also Jay M. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724, 727-31 (1988); Nancy Levit,
Practically Unreasonable: A Critique ofPractical Reason, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 494, 510-14 (1991)
(reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 16
CAL. L. REv. 465, 508-13 (1988) (book review).
25. Nagel, supra note 20, at 59-60.
26. See John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cordozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1326, 1335-36 (1990) (discussing the apparent contradiction between Cardozo's "puritanical" sense of moral absolutes and his pragmatic
concerns); see, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (stating that
building contractors who depart from contract specifications in bad faith cannot rely upon the
doctrine of substantial performance: "The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his
transgression.").
27. At one point, Posner does offer a modest critique of the limitations of Cardozo's pragmatism. Pp. 116-17. Posner states that Cardozo would have displayed a better judicial philosophy
had he been able to take advantage of the tools of "modem economic analysis." This would have
provided "an incisive framework for, or technique of, policy analysis." P. 117. Posner claims
that "intimations" of an economic approach to law can be found in Cardozo's opinion in Adams
v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919) (there is no negligence, and thus no liability, when the
relationship between the seriousness and likelihood of danger is outweighed by the difficulty of
avoiding the risk ab initio). Of course, Cardozo stated this more eloquently: "Chance of harm,
though remote, may betoken negligence, if needless. Facility of protection may impose a duty to
protect." 125 N.E. at 94.
28. Between the endpoints I employ - namely the first edition of RICHARD A. POSNER,
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
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offered an express, detailed, and all-encompassing view of the law:
wealth maximization is and should be the goal of the law and a concern for the efficient distribution of assets was implicit in the common
law. 29 Posner the positivist, the formalist, described the world as it
was (or could be) if only judges used the right analytical tools, to wit,
the tools of the economist. 30 The sophistication and sheer volume of
his work, plus his hubris, made him the best known and most controversial proponent of law and economics. 31 And law and economics
certainly has had its day, figuring prominently in debates inside the
academy, both in th~ pages of law reviews and in the discussions of
curriculum and tenure review committees. 32
In recent years, however, Posner has announced that he is a pragmatist, an antiformalist. In The Problems of Jurisprudence, 33 Posner
disclaimed fealty to grand theory. He rejected law as a branch of exact inquiry based upon principles static over time and unrelated to the
realities of social life. 34 He rejected legal "metaphysics," "artificial
reason," "formalism," and "overarching conceptions" such as "corrective justice," "natural law," and ''wealth maximization. " 35 He acknowledged that wealth maximization cannot provide a complete
EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (the full·blown summary of much of what crune
before) - Posner expressed his law and economics faith with the zeal of the true believer.
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JusncE 6().103 (1981).
30. See John E. Noyes, Book Review, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 410, 411 (1984); Warren Samuels
& Nicholas Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN.
107-08 (1984). Of course, these labels can be slippery. As Posner observes:
For that matter, a natural lawyer can be a positivist - Coke, and maybe Dworkin in his
recent writings, which emphasize interpretation, fit this bill. And maybe a formalist can be
a realist. Economic analysis of law is a formalist edifice erected on a realist base, so one is
not surprised to find that it has been criticized as formalist by antiformalists and as realist by
antirealists. And to the extent that the economic analyst seeks to shape law to conform to
economic norms, economic analysis of law has a natural law flavor.
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 24.
31. One of the great curiosities in all this is that Posner, an English major in college, had no
formal training in economics. Perhaps his term at the Federal Trade Commission opened his
eyes to the magic of markets. See David Ranii, The Next Nominee?, NATL. L.J., Nov. 26, 1984,
at I, 26.
32. Posner has proclaimed law and economics as the dominant theoretical school of legal
analysis. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962·1987, 100
HARV. L. REv. 761, 767-68 (1987). Despite the huge volume of response that his law and economics writing has generated over the years, perhaps the most insightful critique was one of the
first. See Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA,
L. REv. 451 (1974). Leif described the first edition of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law as
"four hundred pages of tunnel vision." Id. at 452. See also Izhak Englard, The System Builders:
A Critical Appraisal ofModem American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51-56 (1980) (indi·
vidualistic conceptions underlying economic efficiency are inapposite in our modem collective
society); Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in
Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) (information costs and market imperfections frustrate economic efficiency).
33. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18.
34. Id. at 15-16, 26.
35. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 26, 28 (emphasis added); cf. Richard A.
Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J.
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theory of distributive justice because it lacks a moral theory to explain
the initial distribution of assets and further that market efficiencies
cannot always be allowed to override moral or egalitarian principles. 36
He told us that the philosophy of science provides judges with two
approaches, "logical deduction" and "empirical observation," neither
of which adequately explains the process actually used by judges to
decide hard cases. Rather, judicial reasoning is primarily a branch of
"practical reason," characterized by "anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 'experience,'
intuition, and induction." 37 Posner cited Cardozo as reflective of (if
not the source of) this pragmatism. 38
This melange of decisional tools is surely much more like the flexible, community-based, self-consciously imperfect jurisprudence Cardozo articulated. But from the pen of the great system-builder,
Richard Posner? What are we to make of this apparently fundamental
change? Although psychobiography is a perilous exercise, the apparently dramatic change in Posner's jurisprudence over a period of only
a few years justifies consideration of whether the shift is real or only
skin-deep, and why it occurred.
First, one can question how much of a change of mind (or of heart)
Posner's recent work really represents. The Problems ofJurisprudence
did not entirely abandon the view that economic analysis can make for
better judicial decisions. Rather, it may represent only a reformulated
claim, that because his law and economics is not "metaphysical" and
not based upon only a "supelficial examination of [the relation of immutable principles] to fact," Posner is not a formalist. 39
333, 340 (1988) (stating that economic analysis can rescue the law from the "horrors of
indeterminacy").
36. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 375-80; see also Bill Grady et al., Judicial
Mating of Sex, Economics. CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1991, § 3, at 3 (Posner observes that economic
analysis "can't tell you whose economic welfare is to be maximized"); Theodore R. Roth, Law
and Economics, U. CHI. MAG., Aug. 1991, at 28, 31 (Posner admits that "[e]conomists •.. tend
to accept the unequal distribution of income as a given, rather than examine it critically.").
37. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 73.
38. Id. at 28-29 (citing CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 66, 113 ("The final cause of law is the
welfare of society"; "[the judge] must get his knowledge .•. from experience and study and
reflection; in brief, from life itself."}). Similarly, Posner's more recent judicial opinions are characterized by a refreshing pragmatism. An excellent example of this is Market Street Assocs. v.
Frey, 941F.2d588 (7th Cir. 1991), in which Posner glowingly endorses the contract doctrine of
"good faith" performance, an approach more likely to reach fair rather than efficient outcomes.
Contrast this with his colleague Frank Easterbrook's hyperformalist approach to the same issue
in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
39. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653, 1663
(1990) (emphasis added}; see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J.
409, 425-28 (1990). Posner's position of course presumes that the central icons of economic
analysis, like wealth maximization, preferences, efficiency, and so on, are themselves not reflective of immutable principles. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1447 (1990); Levit, supra note 24, at 499.
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Maybe it is but a short (but still significant) step from a strict adherence to law and economics to a law and behavioral science perspective, or even more generally, to a broadly interdisciplinary approach to
the law. Posner urges that we jettison our concern for "semantic" and
"metaphysical" goals (like the promotion of human dignity and the
securing of justice) and instead concentrate on issues "factual and empirical."40 Toward this end "[i]nterdisciplinary legal theory is inescapable," and by being more receptive to the sciences we stand the
best chance of understanding "the social behavior we call law." 41
Thus, Posner's law and economics now may be only one aspect of a
larger scientistic view of law.
Posner's pragmatism could also reflect a new modesty for his
claims to the centrality of economic principles to legal analysis. For
example, his 1988 book Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 42 may be considered an acknowledgment of the vitality of a decidedly nonscientific, reader-centered jurisprudence. This explanation is
unlikely to explain matters, however, because although Posner
honored "law and literature" by the attention he gave it, his approach
to the topic was essentially nonliterary, his motives political (to
marginalize it), and his conclusions about its limited utility highly
debatable. 43
One may further hypothesize that Posner's pragmatism is part of a
more general shift toward professional humility, that is, that Posner is
now less willing to make grand claims for the importance of his work
or for law and economics generally.44 Remember, this is a writer who
has regularly articulated a "strong" vision of law and economics, and
any concession to the inherent weaknesses of his theory will doubtless
be pounced on with glee by the legions of Posner-bashers, and, more
generally, critics of law and economics.45 Thus, even a modest midcourse correction could be viewed as the product of mature attitude, of
healthy reflection and self-criticism.46
40. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 387, 123. Elsewhere he hopes for "a method
of social engineering ••. susceptible of objective evaluation, much like the projects of civil engineers." Id. at 122.
41. Id. at 439, 374; cf Benjamin N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND
LITERATURE AND OTHER EssAYS 371 (1931).
42. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18.
43. See John D. Ayer, Aliens Are Coming/ Drain the Pool. 88 MICH. L. REV. 1584 (1990)
(book review); James B. White, What Can a Lawyer Learn From Literature?. 102 HARV. L. REV.
2014 (1989) (book review).
44. Some evidence of this may be found in his writings beginning in the mid-19805. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 39, at 426 & n.84 (noting Posner's cautionary language in his 1983 work The
Economics of Justice).
45. See Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1703-04 (1991)
(book review).
46. Posner considers "mature" attitudes to be the only ones worth taking seriously. See
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 137-71 (describing his analysis as "mature,"
in contrast to other scholars' "romanticism").
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Perhaps the most likely explanation is that Posner is more pragmatic because Posner is now an experienced judge. Cardozo's pragmatism was rooted in his twenty years of practice as an appellate
litigator and later in the enterprise of deciding real controversies involving real people whose lives were directly affected by the outcomes
he selected (and, to an extent, by the rhetoric he chose to explain those
outcomes).47 While the academic is free (indeed, encouraged) to build
systems characterized by blazing originality and boldness of social vision (although few do), the judge is far more constrained.48 The need
to tell the parties what the law is and what sources of authority support this conclusion mark the judge's work. Similarly, the nature of
the appellate court emphasizes collegiality and group decisionmaking,
discourages intellectual autonomy, and tempers cold logic with untidy
instincts such as fairness, compromise, and morality. 49 Indeed, it was
just this sense of the peculiar nature of the judge's job that made Cardozo's extrajudicial writings so valuable. Thus, Posner's pragmatism
is a completely understandable byproduct of the dynamics of his job.50
Pragmatism also would be attractive to Posner for less flattering
reasons. Read broadly, pragmatism is a jurisprudence that largely
frees judges from the shackles that traditionally limit judicial power history, precedent, custom, natural law - replacing them with a
deeply personal process of introspection that hopes to identify the allaround best outcome in a given case. 51 By insisting that the pragmatic
judge is always reasonable and concerned with how the resolution of
hard cases actually affects the real world, criticisms of judicial illegitimacy may be deflected. 52 A pragmatic Judge Posner may thus be
more free to decide cases according to his personal agenda by assuring
observers that he is being reasonable, and that everything relevant is
considered before anything important is decided. 53
47. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, Jurisprudence, Address to the New York State Bar Association Meeting (Jan. 22, 1932), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENIAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 7, 2829 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
48. Harry W. Jones, Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication as Group DecisionMaking. 54 TuL. L. REv. 541, 553-54 (1980).
49. Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters With O. W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828, 1849
(1983); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REv. 887, 901, 904-07 (1987); see
also IRWIN EDMAN, PHILOSOPHER'S HOLIDAY 33 (1938) ("[P]rofessors of philosophy study philosophy; a philosopher studies life."). Posner appears to have recognized these phenomena in
The Problems of Jurisprudence. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 156-57, 465 (discussing practical limits that are imposed on judges).
50. See Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at
23.
51. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that judges necessarily apply
their own "policy, politics, social vision, 'values,' even 'prejudice' " to answer difficult legal questions and that "[p]erhaps the highest aspiration of the judge is reasonableness in adjudication").
52. As Grant Gilmore observed, Cardozo's admission that judges made law was "widely
regarded as a legal version of hardcore pornography." GILMORE, supra note 4, at 77.
53. In particular, Posner is disdainful of the limiting hand of history. While discussing the
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Posner's embrace of pragmatism is also likely a reaction to the experiences of his fellow judge, Robert Bork. Bork, like Posner, is a
prolific and controversial scholar, especially as a result of his vigorous
articulation of an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. s4
As Bork moved to the more public arena of the U.S. Court of Appeals
and to the brink of the Supreme Court in 1987, however, he discarded
a number of the most extreme positions that he had taken while in the
academy (for example, that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly
decided). In his review of Bork's Tempting of America, Posner insightfully commented upon why Bork changed his views: "As a public man, and one who quite properly tried to conciliate critics and
reassure doubters at his confirmation hearing, Bork may have disabled
himself from pressing [his] originalism to its logical extreme... ."ss
With his own sights possibly set on the Supreme Court,s 6 and informed by how Bork's jurisprudence failed in the confirmation process
(the market of public opinion), Posner no doubt perceived the political
virtues of the moderate-sounding jurisprudence of pragmatism. For
an ambitious judge, reasonableness is more likely to play in Peoria
than economic analysis, Cardozo more palatable than Pareto. s7
Additional clues as to why Posner is changing lurk in his examination of Cardozo's reputation. Posner argues that "[p]osthumous reputation is facilitated by the generality, variety, and ambiguity of the
reputee's work, or in short by its adaptability to social, political, and
cultural change" (pp. 60-61). Posner holds up Holmes as an example
difficulty of interpreting constitutional texts, Posner commented that "[t]here are other reasons
for obeying a judicial decision besides the Court's ability to display, like the owner of a champion
airedale, an impeccable pedigree for the decision, connecting it to its remote eighteenth-century
ancestor." Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1990). Posner's writings on statutory interpretation also reflect a disdain for limits on judicial activism. See
Rakowski, supra note 45, at 1697-702.
54. See, e.g. ROBERT H. BORll:, THE TEMFTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION
OF LAW 144 (1990) (stating that a judge interpreting the Constitution should only consider "how
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time [of enactment]").
More broadly, Bork's narrow view of the constitutional protection of individual liberties and his
willingness to think in terms of maximizing society's wealth helped his opponents successfully
characterize him as "cold and uncaring." Roth, supra note 36, at 36.
SS. Posner, supra note 53, at 1379.
56. See generally Ranii, supra note 31, at 26; see also pp. 128-29 (appointment to Supreme
Court enhanced Cardozo's reputation).
57. A similar lesson can be drawn from the brief foray of Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg into
the Supreme Court nomination process. Although he eventually withdrew as a nominee because
of certain personal peccadillos, the nominee was initially the target of criticism because of his
economic analysis of legal issues. In particular, Ginsburg, while serving as an official in the
Office of Management and Budget, had torpedoed Environmental Protection Agency regulations
intended to curtail the use of asbestos. Ginsburg concluded that the cost of the rule outweighed
the benefits, based in part on his decision that a lost human life was worth $22,000. A congres·
sional report characterized the methodology as "morally repugnant." Ginsburg's other law and
economics writings were also widely criticized in conjunction with his short-lived nomination to
the Court. See Robert Pear, Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1987, at 1.
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of a jurist whose reputation was enhanced by "the enigmatic, in a
sense unfinished character of [his] work. . . . His vast and none too
consistent output . . . provided aphorisms for every position in jurisprudence debates and has made the search for the 'true' Holmes a
fascinating, if ultimately insoluble jigsaw puzzle" (p. 61). No one
would characterize Richard Posner circa 1987 that way; indeed, many
would dismiss him as the composer of one creative theme embroidered
with a hundred variations. 58 But if Posner is to succeed in what he
terms "the historical fame derby" (p. 61), he needs to be less predictable, less reducible to "Oh, I know where he comes out on this issue."
So, by introducing a little elusiveness and ambiguity he can garner
attention and interest on the part of reputers.
It is important to remember that Posner is still concerned with
markets, and in the Cardozo book expressly with how one prevails in
the market of reputations. Despite turning out scholarship at a
breakneck pace, Posner must have sensed that he had painted himself
into an intellectual comer, with adverse consequences for his reputation. While the decade 1975-1985 saw the emergence of law and economics as perhaps the most provocative voice in the academy, the sun
has since begun to set on the Chicago school. One reason is the faddishness of intellectual thought (although evolution would be the more
flattering term), which by the late 1980s made the central observations
of law and economics seem less threatening and (this is the true indictment) largely old hat. 59 The dominant theme in the new legal scholarship became a self-consciously personal and nonscientific perspective,
whether feminist, 60 literary,61 or communitarian,62 to name a few of
the contenders. In addition, "pragmatism" is now the rallying cry for
a broad range of essentially flexible, but ultimately conservative schol58. As a rock critic once asked rhetorically when discussing the Moody Blues' album Seventh
Sojourn, "[h]ave they made seven albums one time or one album seven times?"
59. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989). Posner basically
acknowledged this development in his reply to Professor Ellickson. See Richard A. Posner, The
Future ofLaw and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 57, 57 (1989);
see also Roth, supra note 36, at 31 (reach oflaw and economics theory is "slowing"). In 1984, a
more optimistic Posner commented that law and economics had rendered some law professors
"obsolete." Ranii, supra note 31, at 26.
60. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10 (1986).
61. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985).
62. Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). The eclipse of
law and economics is far less pronounced in pockets of the law characterized by market regulation, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control· The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991), and in the public choice literature, if one
considers it to be derivative of economic analysis. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 469
(1987).
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ars. 63 Posner needed to join the battle on their terms and at least appear to be sensitive to the new arguments being made. Law and
Literature: A Misunderstood Relation and The Problems of Jurisprudence were most directly responsive to these concerns, 64 but so also is
Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, in which Posner cleaves himself to
the works of the consummate common law judge and skeptic about
the utility of grand systems. Richard Posner surely is on the move,
but to where we cannot be sure, and this may well improve Posner's
ability to stay on the agenda with reputers, present and future.
Similarly, Posner's methodology of cite-counting as a proxy for
reputation may have been prompted by an interest in shoring up his
reputation. A central thesis of Law and Literature was that great literature is that which stands the test of time as mea~ured by an enduring
concern with reading and understanding the work. 65 This market-oriented, Darwinist view of literature is replayed in the context of citations to legal authority in the Cardozo study. If frequency of citation
is a proxy for Cardozo's good reputation then one surely would like to
know how Richard Posner measures up. Posner modestly does not
tell us, although a methodology similar to that which he used to evaluate Cardozo places Posner in third place on the list of frequency of
citation in law reviews. 66 Similarly, Posner appears very frequently in
casebooks. 67 Both of these measures put the greatest weight on the
view from the academy, because writers in scholarly journals and editors of casebooks constitute the vast bulk of authors and editors in
these venues. But Posner is also frequently cited by other judges. 68
Assuming that cite counting represents an accurate indicator of reputation, 69 Posner is undoubtedly a leading figure in the law, especially
considering that he is only in his early fifties. It is clear from Cardozo
and the books that immediately preceded it that Posner has attempted
to enhance his reputation by providing an increasingly broad, accessi63. See Feinman, supra note 24, at 728-30.
64. This enterprise was at the heart of Law and Literature. The main chapters are Posner's
responses to law and literature critiques of his work offered by Robin West and Richard Weisberg. See Ayer, supra note 43, at 1600-02.
65. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 71-74.
66. He comes in behind Justices Brennan and Rehnquist. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David
M. O'Brien, Gauging Reputations, NATL. L.J., Apr. 1, 1991, at 13, 14.
67. Although not nearly as often for his judicial opinions as for his extrajudicial writings.
One exception is his opinion in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum, 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir.
1985), which appears in at least eight contracts casebooks. See Collins & O'Brien, supra note 66,
at 14, n.7.
68. See Sheldon M. Novick, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, 21 TRIAL 84, 87 (Mar. 1991)
(Book Review); Gordon Crovitz, Winds of Change on the Bench, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1985, at
24.
69. Posner acknowledges that the methodology is not foolproof. Pp. 70-71, 75. For example, the citation count cannot distinguish between critical and flattering references, between a cite
to a work as merely a global summary and one that is a specific discussion of a proposition, nor
distinguish the word black from a reference to (Hugo) Black.

May 1992]

Man in the Mirror

1753

ble, and topical mix of themes and by identifying a methodology of
measurement that, for the time being at least, conveniently reinforces
his predominant stature in contemporary American jurisprudence.
B. Posner the Rhetorician on Cardozo the Rhetorician

Posner has written before on the question of Cardozo's rhetorical
skills. He asserted in 1986 that Cardozo was not a master of judicial
style,7° and in 1988 that Cardozo suffered from "an ornateness that at
times lends an unserious quality to his prose and to his thought. " 71
He also more generally criticized judicial craft (a concern of Cardozo's) as adding nothing of real value to opinions. In essence, rhetoric was a bag of tricks that enabled a judge to make an opinion more
persuasive than its merits warranted.72
In this book Posner is far more charitable, especially to Cardozo's
judicial opinions.73 Cardozo now writes with "striking freshness, clarity, and vividness," with "[t]he power to compress a tradition of legal
thought into a sentence" (pp. 45, 56). Posner salutes both Cardozo's
"writing style" and the "architecture of his opinions," which together
result in "cumulative and mass effect" (pp. 126, 55). A master rhetorician like Cardozo makes it more likely that a judicial opinion will not
be
so chained to the immediate context of its creation. It can be pulled out
and made exemplary of law's durable concerns. That is, it is literature;
literature is the body of texts that survive the context in which they were
created because they speak to us today. The literary judge wears best
over time. [p. 143; footnote omitted]

The way in which Posner discusses the moral language and concerns that frequently crop up in Cardozo opinions represents more
than a grudging appreciation of the work of the nonscientist judge.
Posner points out that Cardozo would strive to reach moral outcomes
and effectively to use the language of moral discourse to reach them.
For example, in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 74 although ignoring the
fact that a contract called for a specific brand of pipe and required that
70. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. R.Ev. 1351,
1386 (1986).
71. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 293. Support for this was found in
Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which led Posner to conclude
that "Cardozo has Brutus' problem: his rhetoric draws attention to itself." POSNER, LAw AND
LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 294.
72. This was the conclusion in chapter 6 of Law and Literature. See Richard Weisberg,
Entering with a Vengeance: Posner on Law and Literature, 41 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1597, 1606 n.34
(1989) (book review); White, supra note 43, at 2037.
73. Posner remains generally unimpressed by Cardozo's extrajudicial writing: "Extended indeed extravagant - metaphor, a tone arch and coy, and staccato sentences lending a dramatic
air to the proceedings - these are hallmarks of the overdone style that is common in Cardozo's
non-judicial prose ...•" P. 22.
74. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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all defective work would be corrected, Cardozo wrote that "[t]he willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression. For him
there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of implied conditions. The
transgressor whose default is unintentional and trivial may hope for
mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong." 75 Later, when defining the duties that arise out of a fiduciary relationship, Cardozo wrote
that "[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." 76 The young Richard Posner surely would have found such moralizing unattractive, and
Cardozo's distaste for the morals of the marketplace would have
seemed to be naive if not wrong-headed. But today's Posner treats this
aspect of Cardozo's writing with respect. 7 1
What might explain Posner's changed evaluation? The most plausible explanation is that Posner now has systematically read all of Cardozo's work, rather than isolated parts.78 However, the new Posner
may in fact be more drawn to Cardozo's rhetorical craft for reasons
not expressly discussed in the book. Posner has been harshly criticized for his attempt to suppress the ethically complex language that
so characterized the common law and to replace it with the more precise but morally empty language of the social scientist and economist~ 79 Perhaps the flap over his advocating "baby buying"
(deregulation of the market in adoption) has alerted him to the impact
that choice of language can have on perceptions of the legitimacy of an
75. 129 N.E. at 891 (citations omitted). Posner also points out how the statement of facts in
this case strikes a populist note, Cardozo implying that the breach of contract action was being
pursued by a "rich man" attempting to harness the law to serve "mandarin" needs. Pp. 106·07.
Cardozo's moral vision and its impact on his judicial decisions is further discussed in Stanley C.
Brubaker, The Moral Element in Cardozo's Jurisprudence, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1979).
76. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Note how the nontraditional sen·
tence structure enhances the impact of the legal rule announced.
77. Posner concludes that "[n]o judge seems ever to have come up with a better formula with
which to express the concept of fiduciary duty." P. 105. Posner also gives attention to less
morally charged aspects of Cardozo's rhetoric. Posner says it is acceptable for Cardozo to pres·
ent facts selectively, and to an extent misleadingly. Pp. 43, 137. A breezy, dramatic flair for
facts, an air of culture, and idiosyncratic though effective departures from English prose style are
all identified as admirable traits (pp. 126-27) as is the skill at coining epigrams. P. 56. Finally,
Posner salutes the tempered (and to some extent oblique) manner in which Cardozo presented
his conclusions: Cardozo's reformist jurisprudence was cloaked so as to be "the quietest of revo·
lutionary manifestos." P. 109.
78. In Law and Literature Posner discussed but one opinion, and it was from Cardozo's
tenure on the Supreme Court. The new book is concerned almost exclusively with the state court
years, which were rhetorically more successful. See Michael L. Richmond, In Defense ofPoesie,
57 FORDHAM L. REv. 901, 926-27 (1989) (book review); Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature
and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 283 (1979).
79. See, e.g., Peter R. Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory: Toward the Expression of an In·
tegrative Ethic far Selfand Culture, 83 MICH. L. REV. 849, 881-83 (1985) (book review) (arguing
that a reductive use of the vocabulary of economics exerts disintegrative pressures upon the law
and society).
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underlying premise. 80 A newfound linguistic sensitivity is particularly
likely because this debate seeped out of academic literature and into
the broader political arena. 81
Posner's own rhetoric in Cardozo is far more tame than that which
used to characterize his extrajudicial writing. There are no slips into
the ad hominem, 82 little parading of erudition for its own sake, 83 and
relatively few suggestions of the distant scientist-observer prevalent in
his law and economics tracts. 84 And when it comes to a glistening
style, Posner provides some of his own. It is almost as if Posner was
inspired to write like Cardozo by virtue of spending time immersed in
Cardozo. Felicitous ~entences and epigrams abound. At one point,
Posner discusses Cardozo's "elliptical and slanted" (p. 38) presenta80. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323, 328, 326, 327, 339, 341 (1978) ("suppliers" (the natural parents); "demanders" (prospective adoptive parents); "unsold inventory stored in a warehouse" (children in foster
care); "prices for children of equivalent quality"; "the marginal costs of producing •.• babies of a
given quality"; "market involving a complex and durable good"). Even Posner's cautionary expressions in this piece are shocking in their dehumanization. "Further, we are speaking only of
sales of newborn infants, and do not suggest that parents should have a right to sell older children." Id. at 344. "Moreover, it is incorrect to equate the possession of property rights with the
abuse of property, even if the property is a human being." Id. "However, so long as the market
for eugenically bred babies did not extend beyond infertile couples and those with serious genetic
disorders, the impact of a free baby market on the genetic composition and distribution of the
human race at large would be small." Id. at 345. See also Forum: Adoption and Market Theory,
67 B.U. L. REV. 59-175 (1987), which devotes 117 pages to Posner's defense of "baby buying"
and three responses thereto. The rhetoric of Posner's defense, here appearing in a mainstream
legal journal, is far more conventional than that found in his original Swiftian (immodest) proposal. This is most noticeable when he insists on referring to the proposal as "deregulation" of
adoption rather than "baby selling." Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoption, 61 B.U. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (1987). For a spirited general attack on Posner's rhetoric, see
Peter R. Teachout, Chicago Exposition: The New American Jurisprudential Writing As a Cultural Literature, 39 MERCER L. REv. 767, 791-99 (1988). But see Donald N. McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752, 761-62 (1988), for a more charitable
view of Posner's use of the economic vocabulary.
81. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Is the Supreme Court Ready for this Kind of Free-Market Justice?, WASH. Posr, Sept. 30, 1984, at Dl.
82. Indeed, Peter Teachout views Posner as a prime instigator of the "new scholarship,''
which, inter a1ia, is characterized by hyper-aggression and a tendency to elevate one's own ideas
through active denigration of competing ideas in the academic marketplace. See Teachout, supra
note 80, at 771-75. Others have noted Posner's rhetorical slipperiness. See Ernest J. Weinreb,
Adjudication and Public Values: Fiss's Critique of Co"ective Justice, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 2 n.3
(1989); White, supra note 43, at 2030. But while Cardozo overall reflects a change, there is still
some zip in Posner's fastball; he takes a gratuitous swipe at unnamed "feminists" who criticized
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), for displaying a
lack of empathy for Mrs. Palsgraf. See p. 47; see also Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on
Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1161.
83. Compare POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 9, in which Posner, who taught
himself Greek as an adult, provides his own translations of classical texts. ·
84. In Cardozo, Posner generally resists seeing all the world through the eyes of an economist, although there are exceptions. At one point he opines that "[c]ommercial morality is perhaps the same thing as efficiency." P. 101. Note that even this proposition is stated in tentative
language. Elsewhere, Posner calls trespassers on land "low-cost accident avoider[s]" (p. 50 n.26)
and property owners "superior Joss avoiders" vis-a-vis water companies. P. 114.
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tion of the facts in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 85 and how it served to
make the opinion more effective. Posner writes, "mention that [plaintiff's only injury] was a stammer would have made the accident seem
not only freakish but silly, a put-on, a fraud. The scale fell on Mrs.
Palsgraf and made her stammer. Tell us another. Great cases are not
silly." 86 The book has a loose, conversational feel that makes it easily
the most readable Posner book yet, and Posner's fondness for his subject is apparent throughout. 87
C. Posner the Judge on Cardozo the Judge

The bulk of Cardozo is devoted to a discussion of a number of
Cardozo's court of appeals decisions. As might be expected, Palsgraf 88 is at center stage. Posner provides an abundance of detail about
the actual facts of Palsgraf, which he contrasts with Cardozo's "elliptical and slanted" presentation (pp. 33-36, 38-39). Posner salutes Car~ ~~b~~~b~~~~~~~~

he left out, viewing this as the mark of a "self-consciously literary
judge." 89 Posner also points out that Cardozo's deviations from stan85. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
86. P. 42. Another example is the pun Posner includes in his discussion of Wood v. DuffGordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), in which Cardozo held that a contract implies that the
recipient of exclusive sales rights must use best efforts; Posner observes that the recipient cannot
''.just sit on his duff." P. 93. Later, Posner compliments Cardozo for not using the opinion to
make "[a] frontal assault [on the doctrine of consideration that] almost certainly would have
failed. Cardozo was not Quixote." P. 95.
87. This change in tone is also reflected in Posner's judicial opinions. For example, in Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 290 (7th Cir. 1983), Posner wrote that children had little or no
liberty interest in staying with their natural parents because when the state intervened, the children were merely going from "one form of bondage to another." The parents had no liberty
interest because "[p]eace of mind is not liberty." 707 F.2d at 292. Compare this to Wyletal v.
United States, 907 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1990), where the majority summarily upheld a trial judge's
award of $25,000 to an octogenarian seriously injured in a collision with a postal truck. Posner,
dissenting, wrote:
It is natural to want to give short shrift to a small case. The district judge succumbed to
the temptation, embodying the findings of fact that Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure required him to make in an unedited oral opinion that neither demonstrates that
he performed his proper function as the trier of fact nor provides an adequate predicate for
our performance of the appellate function.
[Furthermore], the $10,000 that the judge awarded for pain and suffering was shockingly
small. An 85 year old woman broke her hip and as a result must use a walker to walk, and a
bar in the bathroom to lift herself from the toilet seat, and she has suffered pain and the
aggravation of a bladder condition. As the old saying goes old age is not for sissies ••••
She deserves a better shot from the federal courts. I would reverse the judgment and
remand to the district court for further findings.
907 F.2d at 51-53 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("I am at a loss to understand why we should strain the language
and ignore the purpose of the lien-avoidance statute in order to achieve a result that does not
promote, but instead denies, simple justice - layman's justice.").
88. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
89. P. 43. For example, Cardozo placed Mrs. Palsgrafat the far end of the railroad platform
"many feet away" from the explosion. The record does not support this characterization. P. 39.
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dard prose made for an effective "brevity and vividness" (p. 44). Unfortunately, this lively discussion of rhetoric is accompanied by a
rather dispirited analysis of the legal issues involved. 90 Cardozo held
that a negligent defendant is not liable to an unforeseeable plaintiff
because it owes her no duty. Posner concludes: "So Cardozo engineered a minority solution, not markedly superior to the unsatisfactory majority [proximate cause] solution" (p. 41).
Posner is on to something, however, when he recognizes that Cardozo's handling of the facts and the "eloquently pedagogic character"
of Palsgraf contribute to its reputation (pp. 43-45). Sketchy facts do
make it more likely that an opinion will come to stand for a general
principle, and the fame of Judge Andrews' equally theoretical dissent
is noted (pp. 45-46). But Posner fails to follow through on the implications of these observations.91 Indeed, perhaps more was afoot in
1927 than Posner realizes.
Shortly after the intermediate court affirmed the jury award to
Mrs. Palsgraf, the American Law Institute met in Philadelphia to
draft the Restatement of Torts. 92 On the table was the question of a
negligent defendant's duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff. Cardozo, a
member of the ALI, was, along with the others, provided with a summary of the facts from the intermediate court opinion. Even though
he knew it was quite likely that he would be called upon to actually
decide the appeal, Cardozo listened to the lively discussion that ensued. One group argued for a duty analysis and no recovery; the
others proximate cause. By a very narrow margin, the advocates of
90. Posner observes that liability for less than the full consequences of the railroad's negligence may result in under-deterrence. Seep. 37. Later, he criticizes Cardozo for failing to consider the specific ramifications of the foreseeability analysis, and he runs through a stock series of
hypotheticals to prove that Cardozo never came to grips with what really happened to Helen
Palsgraf. See pp. 40-41. Dean Prosser traveled this same ground many years ago, and Posner's
rendition offers no new insights. See William F. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mice. L. REv. 1,
7, 19-32 (1953).
91. Posner is correct when he points to Judge Andrews' dissent as contributing to the fame of
Cardozo's majority opinion, but wrong as to why this is so. Posner says the dissent is "much
praised [but] inept." P. 45. Posner primarily faults Andrews for failing to give specific content
to the operative notion of proximate cause, thus ceding the "legal high ground" to Cardozo's
universal test of "foreseeability." P. 46. But it is just this context-specific, malleable quality that
has made Andrews' approach the majority rule (and thus the "best" rule, at least as measured by
Darwinist notions of the marketplace). Andrews observed that proximate cause is, at base, a
matter "of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense ofjustice, [in which] the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics." Pa/sgraf, 162 N.E. at 103. He explained that "[w]e draw an uncertain and wavering
line, but draw it we must as best we can." 162 N.E. at 104. Not only is Andrews describing
what in fact judges do when deciding difficult negligence cases, but he is sounding the clarion call
of the pragmatist. On the other hand, Cardozo announced a universal rule, ostensibly built on a
neutral principle, that fails to capture the complexity of the problem. Also, even on his own
terms, Cardozo failed to do justice to Helen Palsgraf, who, as a patron of the railroad, was
certainly a foreseeable plaintiff while standing on the platform in defendant's station.
92. The following discussion of Cardozo, Pa/sgraf, and the ALI is drawn from Prosser, supra
note 90, at 4-5.
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duty prevailed. When Cardozo returned to Albany, he was assigned
the majority opinion. He adopted the duty analysis and denied recovery to Mrs. Palsgraf. Andrews' dissent would have affirmed the jury
award based on proximate cause. Shortly thereafter, the duty analysis
became the ALi's official position and Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion was
prominently raised in support of this conclusion.93
In light of these facts, one might consider Palsgraf in a different
light. Might Cardozo and Andrews have agreed, formally or otherwise, to debate the general question of the nature of negligence law
and the subsidiary question of the relationship between duty and proximate cause (and thus, judges and juries) in the pages of the New York
Reports? Perhaps this explains both the factual barrenness and the
theoretical forays that characterized the opinions. This also might explain why Cardozo's opinion seems uncharacteristically insensitive to
Helen Palsgraf and her injuries.94 Posner recognizes that Cardozo
"set out to teach us some basic truths about the law of torts" (pp. 4344), but instead of inspecting the historical record and using it as a
vehicle for a more creative reflection on the case, Posner concludes his
analysis of Palsgraf by swerving back into one of his many paeans to
Cardozo's rhetoric.9s
Another example of Posner's stunted analysis of Cardozo's judicial
opinions arises in his consideration of Palsgraf and the other scope of
liability cases, MacPherson, 96 Wagner, 91 Glanzer, 98 Moch, 99 and Ultramares. 100 Posner tells us that all six deal with essentially the same
question: To whom does a negligent defendant owe a duty? Scattered
throughout the book, each is given some attention. MacPherson (decided in 1916) "inaugurated fundamental changes in American tort
law" because it "change[d] profoundly the climate of opinion regarding privity of contract." 101 Wagner (1921) imposed a duty on a rail93. Id. at 8. As Dean Prosser observed, "[i]t is not likely that any other case in nll history
ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner." Id.
94. See JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MAsKS OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976). Posner discusses Noonan's critique of the Palsgraf opinion, but in another context. Pp. 16-17.
95. P. 47. Posner's lack of interest in the history of Palsgrafis fully consistent with his other
writings. See supra note 53. Posner also fails to note the connection between the "pedagogic"
nature of the opinion and its uniform appearance in torts casebooks. Palsgraf is a favorite of
torts teachers precisely because it is not tethered to the particular facts of Helen Palsgraf's claim.
When Cardozo contrasts tort law to the law of crimes, cites leading British cases, and offers
hypotheticals (and Andrews responds more or less in kind), the essential disputes of tort law are
laid bare. This is the stuff of great Socratic dialogues and it explains why the case remains
relevant today, far more so than Cardozo's writing style or the "rule" that purports to come out
of the case.
96. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
97. Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
98. Glanzer v. Shephard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
99. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
100. IBtramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
101. Pp. 42, 109. Before MacPherson, the general rule was that the consumer of a product
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road to use reasonable care to protect a person trying to rescue
another who had been injured by the negligent operation of its trains.
Posner cites this opinion as a key illustration of a Cardozo "master
principle": "a person should be presumptively liable for the injuries
he inflicts if the relevant lay community would think the injurer seriously in the wrong" (p. 101). In Glanzer (1922), Cardozo held that
weighers who were hired by sellers owed a duty to buyers who relied
upon their (the weighers') representations. Posner describes this decision as exemplary of Cardozo's moral concern with extending liability
beyond the formalities of the law of contracts and to deserving plaintiffs (pp. 100-01). In contrast, the remaining scope of liability case$,
decided 1928-1931, all result in no liability for culpable defendants,
even when the consequences of the negligence were foreseeable. 102 At
the penultimate point in the book, Posner compares only four of these
opinions (MacPherson, Glanzer, Moch, and Ultramares), and pronounces the mixed bag of outcomes "puzzling."103
Here again, Posner fails to garner valuable information from the
historical record. There is a clear trend in the six cases. The early
Cardozo opinions were willing to break with precedent and ignore the
strictures of contract and other impediments to creating symmetry between negligence and liability. The later opinions reversed field. By
considering together only four of the opinions and by failing to note
the chronology, Posner missed a chance to think more critically about
his subject. Why might Cardozo, after becoming Chief Judge in 1927,
begin to write opinions denying liability? Cardozo could well have
been responding to the larger economic forces at work: while expansive tort liability was justified in the context of the vigorous capitalism
practiced in pre-Depression New York, the advent of the Depression
might well counsel a changed course. This is certainly possible, but it
is not mentioned in the opinions (or in Posner's book). Posner comes
tantalizingly close to what is likely the explanation when he observes
that the inconsistency in these opinions actually added to Cardozo's
reputation (p. 113). But he does not suggest that the change might
have occurred because Cardozo hoped to impress others with his balance and flexibility. G. Edward White has tried to glean from the
could not sue the nonprivy manufacturer for personal injury. The exception was if the product
was "abnormally dangerous." Cardozo turned the exception into the rule by allowing essentially
any product that causes injury to be considered "abnormally dangerous." See W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 96, at 682-83 (5th ed. 1984).
102. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896 (water works owes no duty to owner of house that burned down
as a result of defendant's water mains lacking adequate pressure); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (negligent railroad owes no duty to patron injured by explosion while
standing on its platform); Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441 (negligent accounting firm owes no duty
to a nonclient recipient of its audit report).
103. P. 109. Posner does try to reconcile these decisions by considering whether they can be
justiiied by identification of the "superior loss avoiders." Posner concludes that even on that
basis Ultramares was wrongly decided. Pp. 113-15.
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historical record evidence of Cardozo's crass ambition and longstanding desire to be elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court. 104 After years of
being the bridesmaid, Cardozo could well have been positioning himself for such an appointment, knowing that a Republican president
was unlikely to elevate an unswerving reformer, no matter how well
regarded by the bench and bar.1os
This historical understanding of Cardozo may also shed light on
Posner's performance as a judge. Richard Posner has now completed
a decade on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Posner
came to the bench with a long record of academic writing. His view
was that economic concepts were relevant not just to legal problems
like antitrust that are understandably susceptible to economic analysis,
but also to nonmarket issues, including torts, family law, civil procedure, and constitutional law. 106 In his early years as a judge, he set to
the task of incorporating economic analysis into a broad range of decisional law. 107 The best known of his efforts at this enterprise have
been unsuccessful.
For example, in Merritt v. Faulkner, 108 the question presented was
whether a trial judge abused discretion by denying appointment of
counsel to an indigent prisoner who had alleged that his blindness was
the result of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The panel
reversed. Posner dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the inability of the
prisoner to obtain counsel on his own proved that the claim was without merit: "a prisoner who has a good damages suit should be able to
hire a competent lawyer and ... by making the prisoner go this route
we subject the probable merit of his case to the test of the market." 109
Thus, in lieu of analyzing the factors traditionally weighed by the Sev104. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 255-56.
105. Cardozo's name had been floated for a Supreme Court appointment as early as 1916,
and it came up again, and more seriously, in conjunction with several vacancies in the 1920s.
Staunch Republicans Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover served as President from 1921 to 1932. Hoover finally nominated Cardozo in the waning months of his presi·
dency. See Carmen, supra note 5, at 616-44. Another possible explanation for Cardozo's change
was that it resulted from his becoming Chief Judge in 1927. His view of that job may have
prompted him to seek to build consensus by accommodating the views of others. Some sensed
this phenomenon in William Rehnquist after he became Chief Justice. See David O. Stewart,
Reconsidering Rehnquist, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1988, at 40.
106. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
107. A number of commentators have surveyed Posner's judicial opinions. See, e.g., George
M. Cohen, Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of the Law: The View
From the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1985); Samuels & Mercuro, supra note 30; James G.
Wilson, Constraints ofPower: The Constitutional Opinions ofJudges Scalia, Bork. Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171, 1217-47 (1986); Larry L. Chubb, Note, Economic
Analysis in the Courts: Limits and Constraints, 64 IND. L.J. 769 (1989). The authors generally
conclude that economic analysis and language appear with some regularity in Posner's judicial
opinions, but not nearly as frequently as in his extrajudicial writing. See, e.g., Chubb, supra, at
800-01.
108. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983).
109. 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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enth Circuit to guide the trial judge's exercise of discretion, Posner
would "consign to the verdict of the marketplace the issue of prisoner
representation." 110 Posner's position was rejected by the court that
day, and it has not prevailed since.111
Similarly, in 1986 Posner was asked to consider the appropriate
standard for a trial judge to use when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction. Posner responded, "P x Hp > (1-P) x Hd." 112 For
readers who were not up to the task of translating this algebraic
formula, he explained that an injunction should issue:
only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied by
the probability that the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff, in
other words, will win at trial), exceeds the harm to the defendant if the
injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting the injunction would be an error. 113

This, according to Posner, is the "procedural counterpart" to Learned
Hand's "famous negligence formula" that is now a conventional shorthand for the economic approach to determining whether a defendant
acted negligently. 114 Posner emphasized that his approach was "not
offered as a new legal standard," but represented "just a distillation of
the familiar . . . test that courts use in deciding whether. to grant a
preliminary injunction." 115 It was "intended not to force [judges] into
110. 697 F.2d at 769 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
111. Market analysis was mentioned, but not made dispositive, in a later concurring opinion
by fellow judge and kindred economist Frank Easterbrook. See Darden v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
797 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit flatly rejected Posner's economic analysis
of indigent litigation. In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1989).
112. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
113. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593.
114. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593; see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (stating that a defendant is negligent when the burden of
avoiding an accident (B) is less than the likelihood of the accident occurring (P) multiplied by the
seriousness of the accident if it were to occur (L)). Judge Hand's approach has found acceptance
in tort law because it captures the balancing enterprise that is central to the context-specific
determination of reasonable care in the circumstances. But the theory offers little improvement
on the more conventional balancing of factors prescribed by the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS§§ 291-293 (1965), and its persistence owes much to Posner's insistent championing of the
formula as a paradigm example of how economics can inform the analysis of nonmarket issues.
See, e.g., David v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1986); Llaguno v.
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673
F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS 1-9 (1982) (chapter 1 is entitled ''The Learned Hand Formula for Determining Liability," and includes a frontispiece picture of Judge Hand); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972). More recently, Posner's cheerleading for the Hand
formula has become somewhat less insistent. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc. 826 F.2d 1554,
1557 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries
may continue to frustrate efforts to measure expected accident costs with ..• precision .•..
[J]uries may be forced to make rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the factors in the Hand Formula.").
115. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593.
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a quantitative straitjacket" but rather to direct attention to the relationship among factors relevant to the central question: the risk of
error. 116 The dissenting judge rejected Posner's modest characterization and emphasized the importance of the flexibility traditionally exercised when a judge considers whether to grant a preliminary
injunction. 117 Subsequent panels of the Seventh Circuit damned the
algebraic formula with faint praise, 118 emphasized its substantive and
procedural links to traditional doctrine, 119 and criticized the supposed
precision that it offered as being an inappropriate substitute for the
trial judge's "intuitive sense about the nature of the case." 120 No appellate judge, including Posner, has attempted actually to implement
the formula mathematically. After an initial flurry of interest, this attempt to interject "science" into the law has passed into the mist of the
Seventh Circuit, and, with one modest exception, it has never been
followed outside of Posner's court.1 21
Posner has been more successful promoting economic analysis in
cases involving market-oriented issues, such as antitrust, and in
nonmarket cases, such as torts, in which a balancing of costs and benefits is understandable, if not always discussed in an explicitly economic
way. 122 But when economics is an unlikely tool, Posner has failed to
116. 780 F.2d at 593-94. The cost of erroneously denying an injunction increases with the
magnitude of the harm the plaintiff will incur from denial and the probability that the plaintiff
will eventually win at trial, and the cost of erroneously granting an injunction increases with the
harm the defendant will incur from the grant and defendant's probability of eventually
prevailing.
117. Judge Swygert described Posner's formula as a "Homeric Siren," a "seductive but deceptive security," that was ultimately antithetical to the flexible, imprecise nature of equitable
decisionmaking. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Arnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1434-35 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner's formula is "effective shorthand" but, in analyzing preliminary injunctions, it is "impossible to think in terms of a single correct result"; "[i]mplicit in equity's connection to the vague
concept of fairness is a need for flexibility.").
119. See Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271, 274 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986).
120. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1436.
121. American Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (Miss. 1988) (characterizing Posner's opinion as the "familiar balancing test ••• perceptibly explicated - and applied"). Not
surprisingly, academics found Posner's proposal noteworthy, and articles on the subject quickly
followed. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its
Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 279 (1987); Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1987). Both of these articles trace (and
applaud) the general downward trajectory of Posner's formula.
122. See Richard A. Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to ''Richard Posner's Praxis," 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1083 (1989) (summarizing the correspondence of his views with the antitrust
decisions of the Supreme Court). Posner is, of course, not the only influential law and economics
scholar to sit on the bench: Frank Easterbrook and Robert Bork have played roles at least as
important as Posner in imposing efficiency-oriented considerations on antitrust and related market fields. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution ofAntitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228-57 (1989).
Issues of procedural due process have also provided those so inclined with an opportunity to
view legal problems through an economist's lens. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33249 (1976); Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (advocating "a simple cost-benefit test of general applicability"). As with much economic analysis of
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convince others of the wisdom of his all-encompassing world view.
This is not to say that Posner has been uninfiuential on the bench. To
the contrary, his judicial opinions are cited by other judges very frequently, and his analyses and outcomes are more or less consistent
with the rightward tilt of the federal courts as a result of Ronald Reagan's and George Bush's appointments. 123
Posner has been decidedly more effective when he hews to more
traditional methods of deciding cases. A good example of this is the
line of Posner opinions in civil rights cases beginning with Bowers v.
De Vito. 124 In Bowers, one Vanda had been found not guilty of murder
by reason of insanity and was committed to a public mental health
facility. Vanda was released from custody and one year later he killed
a young woman. Her administrator filed a wrongful death action
against the various public defendants, alleging that the reckless release
violated section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, relying
upon a recent Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. California, 125 that
had held that because five months had passed between the negligent
release and the murder, notions of proximate cause precluded government liability. 126 After Martinez, it would seem that the one-year gap
in Bowers would have made a per curiam affirmance of the trial judge
the almost certain outcome. Posner, however, saw in the case something more, and, out of the clay of a relatively straightforward damages action, he molded a global theory of the Constitution.
[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against
being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state
fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose,
any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of
legal issues, the due process calculus is long on technique but short on questions of value. See
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CO/cu/us for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value. 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976).
123. See Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 766 (1987);
Marcia Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, NATL. LJ., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22.
Frank Easterbrook has argued that the Supreme Court's decisions increasingly reflect an
economist's ex ante perspective. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term -Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-14, 19-42 (1984). If this is
to say that the Court is unwilling to yield reflexively to claims based upon justice and other
inefficient normative notions, he surely is right. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REV. 592, 598 (1985) (stating that Court
opinions "insensitive to constitutional concerns bearing on the distribution of wealth and power''
may be based on "substantive judgments" that are merely masked by a "cost-benefit patina").
124. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
125. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
126. 444 U.S. at 285 ("[W)e do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this
parole decision, appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers'
action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law.").
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negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require
the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.127

This notion of "negative liberties" is not entirely new; the reluctance of the Supreme Court to impose upon government an affirmative
constitutional obligation to provide services dates back at least to San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 128 The Bowers opinion, however, represented a bold foray into constitutional theorizing
by a relatively new federal judge.1 29
Posner's constitutional theory was thereafter discussed by noted
scholars, 130 and ultimately given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 131
Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted the negative rights analysis in toto. 132
The Rehnquist-Posner view is that the Bill of Rights is only a charter
of negative liberties, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no
affirmative obligations upon the states. This negative liberties approach may well misread the history of the amendment, which was
intended to interpose the federal government into the process by
127. Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618. Judge Wood dissented on the grounds that Bower's appeal
had been decided without benefit of oral argument and without considering the possibility that
Martinez could be limited to claims against parole officials, as opposed to medical defendants.
686 F.2d at 619 (Wood, J., dissenting).
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, a narrow majority of the Court, including all of Richard Nixon's appointees, effectively killed "fundamental rights" analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which had previously been read to require governments to provide certain minimal
services to all citizens. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw
§§ 16-35, 16-40 (1988).
129. Less than a year after Bowers, Posner expanded upon his constitutional theory. In Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), he
observed:
.
[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote
the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but
that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the
height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental services. Of course, even in the laissez-faire
era only anarchists thought the state should not provide the type of protective services at
issue in this case. But no one thought federal constitutional guarantees or federal tort reme·
dies necessary to prod the states to provide the services that everyone wanted provided.
[Proposals that find in the Fourteenth Amendment a right to basic government services]
would be more than an extension of traditional conceptions of the due process clause. It
would tum the clause on its head. It would change it from a protection against coercion by
state government to a command that the state use its taxing power to coerce some of its
citizens to provide services to others.
715 F.2d at 1203-04.
130. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864
(1986); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmatfre
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985).
131. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
132. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. Interestingly, Posner wrote the lower court opinion in
DeShaney. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1987). His opinion there summarizes the negative rights arguments he had previously made in
Jackson and Bowers. See DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301.
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which states determined how to spend their resources; 133 worse, such
an interpretation may provide a temptingly talismanic answer to complex questions. 134 But bad law or not, this is now the law of the land.
Why was Posner able to prevail in the marketplace of legal ideas
with a fresh articulation of constitutional theory while failing, even in
his own circuit, to revise the rules controlling appointment of counsel
for indigents or the granting of preliminary injunctions? There are
several possible explanations. First, in his early years on the bench,
while still full of an academic's sense of invincibility, Posner proposed
law and economics solutions to problems perfectly addressable by familiar legal tools, such as the factors that courts have looked to for
generations when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Judges
would not accept Posner's proposals because they believed that what
Posner added was wrong (if it was intended to change the law) and
superfluous (if it was not). 135 Second, his proposals were dressed in
unfamiliar terms, especially the algebraic formula, and the resistance
from judges not trained in economics was predictable. 136 Both of
these phenomena reflect Posner's naivete about the nature of the judiciary as he began his service in the early 1980s. The reluctance of
judges to embrace high theory, let alone numeric reductionism, no
doubt came as a surprise to Posner after a decade of helping set the
agenda in the academy. On the other hand, his negative rights approach to the Constitution was supported by (one version of) history,
required no "insider's" expertise to evaluate or implement, and was
timed perfectly to fit with a narrowing vision of the role of the federal
courts vis-a-vis the states that had come into full flower in the 1980s.

D. Posner the Persona on Cardozo the Persona
Posner tells us that Cardozo has been termed a "saint," a status
derived from the "gentleness, modesty, tact, considerateness, mildness,
circumspection, judiciousness, and moderation of the Cardozo persona. "137 Cardozo was generous in his praise of others and worked
133. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990); David A. Logan, Judicial
Federalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. REv. 453 (1987).
134. Currie, supra note 130, at 887.
135. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 609-10 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
136. 780 F.2d at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("[Posner's] formula invites members of the
Bar to dust off their calculators and dress their arguments in quantitative clothing. The resulting
spectacle will perhaps be entertaining, but I do not envy the district courts of this circuit and I
am not proud of the task we have given them.").
137. P. 8. One of Cardozo's former law clerks, Paul Freund, has recounted a good example
of Cardozo's humility.
Cardozo was allergic to super-sophistication or pretentiousness. The law clerk, imbued with
the brave new insights of sociological jurisprudence, saw his chance to have those insights
confirmed. "When you voted as you did in the Palsgraf case," he inquired of the Justice,
"you did so, didn't you, because you thought that was a sound allocation of social costs?"
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effectively with his fellow judges, only rarely offering dissent to their
opinions (pp. 8, 120-21, 130). He had no strong political agenda and
recognized the advantages of moderation in a judge: "Cardozo was an
incrementalist working primarily in an incremental medium, the common law" (p. 126). Cardozo took pains to avoid appearing the "ostentatious liberal" (p. 121).
Also contributing to Cardozo's reputation was the close relationship he cultivated with academics. His relatives served on the board of
Columbia University, 138 and, after serving on the state bench for only
eight years, he was asked to give the Storrs Lectures at Yale Law
School. This series of four speeches on his judicial philosophy later
became The Nature of the Judicial Process. 139 The success of these
lectures paved the way for additional appearances in the academy and
resulting extrajudicial writings. 140 Cardozo peppered these works and
his judicial opinions with frequent and flattering references to the
work of legal academies (p. 132), paying close attention to those who
could enhance his reputation. And yet, he attempted to make his writing, and especially his judicial opinions, convey to the larger community the norms that animated the common law.141
Cardozo was lucky, and this, too, made a difference. He was able
to serve on the high court of the most populous state when both the
court and the state were at the zenith of their influence. 142 His antiformalist philosophy coincided with the realist positions that were
beginning to gain favor, and the common law issues that were the staple of this court's caseload were perfectly suited to his judicial approach.143 His colleagues on the New York Court of Appeals were
generally of like mind. While his Washington years were not his best,
the opportunity to serve on the Supreme Court was, at least professionally, a matter of good fortune. 144
Finally, Cardozo was a very hard worker. He had few outside inThe Justice put on a look of wide-eyed innocence. "Why no," he said, "I voted as I did in

Palsgraf because I thought that was what the law was."
Paul A. Freund, Foreward: Homage to the Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (1979).
138. WHITE, supra note 5, at 254.
139. Id. at 256. Cardozo first turned down the invitation, protesting that he had nothing
useful to say. White terms this reflective of "a certain coyness." Id. For a more sympathetic
view of the events leading up to the Yale lectures, see Bricker, supra note 5, at 23 n.112.
140. WHITE, supra note 5, at 259.
141. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 1348.
142. P. 129. As Cardozo put it in his typically modest manner, "I do not know how it will
all end. I know that it has been an interesting time to live in, an interesting time in which to do
my little share in translating into law the social and economic forces that throb and clamor for
expression." Cardozo, supra note 47, at 45.
143. Pp. 27-31. Posner contrasts Cardozo to Robert Jackson in this regard. "[Jackson's]
experience in the upper echelons of government ..• [might have led him to consider] service on
such a [common law] court one long snore." P. 141.
144. Pp. 128-29; see also supra note 1.
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terests and his dedication to his work was remarkable. 145 Despite a
random assignment system, Cardozo actually wrote more opinions
than his state court colleagues and, despite poor health, continued to
outpace the productivity of his colleagues on the Supreme Court. 146
Parallels between Cardozo and Posner are instructive. Both were
sons of lawyers, born in New York City to politically active Jewish
parents; both attended Ivy League Schools. 147 Both were brilliant and
bookish, 148 pursuing intellectual interests (including the Greek classics) outside of the technical confines of the law, 149 while attending to
their professional responsibilities with great vigor. 150 Both were wellconnected to influential reputers in the academy, and were skilled, if
not always subtle, self-promoters. 151 And, of course, both were prolific writers. 152
Posner, like Cardozo, has been lucky. His market-oriented approach to the law· coincided neatly with the supply side economics
145. See Freund, supra note 137, at 3; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., A Personal View ofJustice Benjamin N. Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 9-10 (1979).
146. P. 86. Posner identifies Cardozo's writing of full rather than per curiam opinions as the
reason for Cardozo's greater output on the Court of Appeals. P. 86.
147. See supra note 1; Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. Posner's parents made young Richard
donate his model train set to the newly-orphaned children of convicted spies Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg. David Margolick, An Unusual Caurt Nominee, Judging by His Family, N.Y. TIMES,

~~~-~

.

148. Posner's Yale A.B. was granted summa cum /aude and his Harvard LL.B. magna cum
/aude. Justice William Brennan characterized Posner as one of only two "authentic geniuses" he
had met in his lifetime. (The other was William 0. Douglas.) Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. On his
part, Cardozo graduated from Columbia College with the highest scholastic record in its history,
SIDNEY H. AsCH, THE SUPREME CoURT AND ITS GREAT JUDGES 147 (1971), and one of his
clerks likened his job to being "clerk to an encyclopedia." Freund, supra note 137, at 3.
149. See POSNER, JURlSPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 9; POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE,
supra note 18, at 110-12 (exemplifying Posner's interest in the classics); DREW PEARSON & ROBERT
ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 220 (1936) (noting that Cardozo would often wake up
before 6 a.m. and read Greek). Posner's recent opinion in Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081,
1089-104 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) is a tour de force of displayed erudition. En
route to striking down an ordinance that criminalized nude dancing, Posner discussed, inter alia,
the history and psychology of erotic dance, bullfighting, cabarets, tone poems, Eliot, Shakespeare, Titian, Holst, Strauss, Manet, Balthus, Balanchine, and Beardsley.
150. Pp. 86-89. Posner has averaged 90 opinions a year while on the bench. In comparison,
in 1990 Judge Easterbrook authored 73, while other high visibility Reagan appointees Ralph
Winter, Roger Miner, Alex Kozinski, and Edith Jones authored 36, 27, 22, and 50, respectively.
151. It has been reported that Posner provides his former Chicago colleagues with copies of
his opinions, see Ranii, supra note 31, at 1, and on his own initiative provides the same service to
other academics. See Weisberg, supra note 72, at 1605 n.31. A call to Judge Posner's chambers
on January 21, 1992, yielded a copy of a 59-page curriculum vitae, updated to December 23,
1991. Included are cites to every judicial opinion he has authored, including per curiam opinions.
Posner's concern with reputers is further exemplified by his frequent citations to authorities
especially likely to impress an academic reader. In Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588
(7th Cir. 1991), a nine-page opinion, Posner provided ten cites to five law review articles, seven
cites to four treatises, two to the Restatement, two to Cardozo, and one each to Judges Friendly
and Hand.
152. Cardozo did not rely heavily upon law clerks to draft opinions; neither does Posner. See
Freund, supra note 137, at 3;Ranii, supra note 31, at 26.

s.
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embraced by the Reagan Administration. This helped make him one
of the new president's first nominees to the federal bench. During his
first decade of service the Supreme Court became increasingly conservative. In large measure because of his efforts, and due to the receptivity of the high court to conservative outcomes, the Seventh
Circuit's reputation has grown markedly.153
Unlike Cardozo, however, Posner's luck may have begun to run
out. Within a very short time after his appointment to the federal
bench in 1981, Posner's name was being prominently discussed as
Reagan's next nominee to the Supreme Court. 154 By 1986, Posner was
still "regularly mentioned,"I 55 but the failed nomination of Robert
Bork in 1987 appears to have derailed the Posner express. Bork
presented an easy target for opponents because of his extensive writings on a broad range of controversial subjects, including race and
abortion. I56 The crucifixion of Bork in the political process convinced
the White House to select a nominee "less controversial or doctrinaire
than Bork."I 57 In this changed environment, Posner was viewed as
too risky.I 58 Similar concerns afilicted George Bush's consideration of
replacements for William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall; less ideology was needed - or at least less of a paper trail - and Posner's
prospects were dashed. I59
153. Noreen Marcus, Rule of Law (and Economics), AM. LAW., June, 1988, at 38.
154. Ranii, supra note 31, at 1 (Posner "at the top of most lists"); Kathleen Sylvester, Fertile
Ground for the Supreme Court, NATL. L.J., May 9, 1983, at 24 (Posner the most likely
candidate).
155. John Riley, Has Judge Posner Gone Too Far?, NATL. L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 3.
156. BORK, supra note 54, at 268-349; ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE
BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL,
THE PEOPLE RlsING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989).
157. Kenneth Karpay, Many Wait in Wings To Be Bork's Understudy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
12, 1987, at 2.
158. Id.; see also Roth, supra note 36, at 32 (Posner is "Bork in spades").
159. See Fred Barnes, Weirdo Alert, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 7 (Clarence Thomas is
confirmable because he lacks a significant paper trail while Posner is not confirmable because he
has one). Interestingly, in the years since Bork's defeat, Posner's intellectual independence has
led him to take positions, both on and off the bench, that undoubtedly have damaged his prospects with the conservatives in the White House who screen candidates for the Supreme Court.
For example, in Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), Posner voted to strike down an ordinance that criminalized nude dancing. His separate
opinion explained why, contrary to the view of many blue noses, "low art" (like striptease) is just
as expressive, and thus, just as deserving of protection under the First Amendment, as ballet or
classical painting, adding for good measure that "(c]ensorship of erotica is pretty ridiculous."
904 F.2d at 1100.
Another example of Posner's intellectual independence comes from his recent review of a
book describing the role of lawyers in Nazi Germany. Toward the end of the piece Posner
writes:
Our retention, indeed our expanding use, of capital punishment, our other exceptionally
severe criminal punishments (many for intrinsically minor, esoteric, or archaic offenses), our
adoption of pretrial detention (as a result of which some criminal defendants languish in jail
for two years or more while awaiting trial), and our enormous prison and jail population
(almost 1 million - close to one-half of one percent of the American population), mark us
as the most penal of the civilized nations today.
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Posner is different from Cardozo in one other important way. Cardozo was revered. His personal qualities of humility, compassion, and
moderation are the stuff of legends. His leadership of his court earned
the respect of his colleagues, lawyers, and academics. Upon his death,
the law reviews at Columbia, Harvard, and Yale all published identical tributes provided by Harlan Stone, Learned Hand, Irving Lehman,
Warren Seavey, Arthur Corbin, and Felix Frankfurter. 160 A law
school has been named after him, as have secondary schools. Cardozo
was loved as well as respected in a way perhaps unmatched by any
other figure in American law. Although he is far from having decided
his last case or written his last book, Posner has no such favorable
persona. 161
CONCLUSION

Although by nature a very private person, Benjamin Cardozo lived
a very public life. 162 More than half a century after his death, his
career and works are still considered significant. Because of his pragmatic jurisprudence, the breadth and depth of his writing, the sheen of
his rhetoric, his solicitous relationship with reputers, his good luck,
and his impeccable personal qualities, Cardozo's reputation is secure,
as Posner's book shows.
But what of Richard Posner himself? Many of these same qualities
can be found in Posner, but a few critical ones cannot. The Richard
Posner who came to the federal bench was the product of the academy. He thrived in the abstract and increasingly rough-and-tumble
pages of academic journals, on occasion collaborating with others, but
Posner continues:
Perhaps in the fullness of time the growing of marijuana plants, the "manipulation" of
financial markets, the sale of dirty magazines, the bribery of foreign government officials, the
facilitating of suicide by the terminally ill, and the violation of arcane regulations governing
the financing of political campaigns will come to be seen no more appropriate objects of
criminal punishment than "dishonoring the race." Perhaps not; but Miiller's book can in
any event help us to see that judges should not be eager enlisters in popular movements of
the day .•..
Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36, 41-42 (reviewing INGO
MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE CoURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991)); see also Grady et al.,
supra note 36, § 3, at 3 (Posner proposes giving "legal recognition to homosexual cohabitation").
Posner has recently commented that the judicial selection process would be "extremely repulsive ..•• [Furthermore], I don't think there's a machinery for processing [all of my] writing
through the Congressional intellect." Roth, supra note 36, at 32.
160. See Tributes to Mr. Justice Cardozo, in 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 1-118, 52 HARV. L. REv.
353-470, 48 YALE L.J. 371-488 (1939). Another outpouring of personal and professional tributes to Cardozo may be found at 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 1-342 (1979).
161. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 153, at 40 (noting that Posner does not have "the interpersonal skills to be [a] leader[]"); Martha Middleton, Shaping a Circuit in the Chicago School
Image, NATL. L.J., July 20, 1987, at l, 35 (characterizing Posner as "intellectually aggressivesome go so far as to say arrogant"); Ranii, supra note 31, at 26 (stating that it is not easy for some
people to get along with Posner because "he [doesn't] know how to make his intellectual inferiors
..• feel comfortable").
162. WHITE, supra note 5, at 255.
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by and large walking the intellectual highwire by himself. With virtually no law practice under his belt, he was unprepared for the more
collegial nature of the appellate bench and unfamiliar with the common sense, intuitions, and sense of moderation that inform the experienced lawyer and the pragmatic judge. At one point in Cardozo,
Posner observes:
[Holmes, Brandeis, Jackson, and Hand] are stronger judicial personalities than Cardozo: more opinionated, more aggressive intellectually,
more programmatic. Of all the great judges of his (approximate time)
Cardozo is perhaps the most neutral, the most even, the most at home in
the legal profession, the most comfortable insider: the most professional
judge. [pp. 142-43]

This surely does not describe the aggressive, doctrinaire Richard Posner of the early 1980s.
But Posner wants to live the inspected life, 163 and there is evidence
that he is changing, both in his judicial opinions and his extrajudicial
writings, including Cardozo. The evolution of such a powerful intellect bodes well for the bench and bar, the academy, and citizens alike.
At one point, when extolling Cardozo's instinct for the pragmatic,
Posner observes that "Cardozo was no Quixote" (p. 95). Perhaps a
decade from now we will be able to say the same thing about Richard
Posner.

163. See, e.g., POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18:
My last acknowledgment is to the late Paul Bator, who in a review of an earlier book of
mine called me "a captive of a thin and unsatisfactory epistemology." I found this an arresting accusation and one with considerable merit, and it stimulated me to examine the
problems of jurisprudence in greater depth than I had ever expected to.
Id. at xiv (citation omitted).

